Here is an interesting story about what can happen when personhood becomes the standard of rights bearing rather than moral value determined by our human nature. Wesley Smith writes a great post about a group seeking to legally identify a chimpanzee as a person.
The term is so meaningless that animals can be argued to be persons while unborn humans are excluded. This is not the argument of one fringe group. Singer utilitarians endorse the rights of animals over humans under certain conditions dependent upon the utility of the human in question.
HT: Second Hand Smoke
Friday, September 28, 2007
Person is not the Point [Jay]
In this post by Dr. Allen Stairs at AskPhilosophers, he responds to a question about an inconsistency between objecting to capital punishment on the grounds that you may be killing an innocent person, and affirming the right to abortion though the act may be killing an innocent person. Dr. Stair’s response hinges on pointing out that in one instance the question of the guilt or innocence of a determined person is the central question, and the other the actual determination of personhood is the question. He appears to think that this draws a clear distinction between the two issues.
His answer is a bit deceptive though. He frames the abortion issue as hinging on the identity of the fetus as a person and he develops a bit of straw man by behaving as if this was the claim of the pro-lifer in general.
"The question presumably isn't whether the fetus is biologically alive; it surely is. The question (or part of it anyway) is what this living being is. One common way of putting it is to ask whether the fetus is a person -- a being with the same moral standing as you or me."
He calls it the Ronald Reagan argument. My favorite line is where he states:
"Whether or not a fetus is a person seems to be what someone once called an essentially contested question: there may be no straightforward fact to be had."
This answer is misleading. Even if I am willing to stipulate the differentiation between the two objections; (1) Capital Punishment is morally wrong because we risk killing an innocent person. (2) Abortion is morally wrong because we risk killing an innocent person. The wrong of (1) is that we are certainly killing a person who may or may not have committed a capital offense. The wrong of (2) is that we are certainly killing an innocent life that may or may not be a person. Therefore the objections are of a different nature and do not demonstrate an inconsistency in the logic of the pro-choice capital punishment objector.
The problem in the answer is that he assumes too much. The question was framed using the word person and Dr. Stairs takes this allowance and runs with it without clarification. He is absolutely correct in stating that there may be no straightforward fact to be had on identifying a fetus as a person. That is not due to the nebulous nature of the fetus, though. It is because the term person and the qualities of personhood are themselves nebulous. The question of the humanity of the unborn is the central argument of the pro-life position. The personhood of the fetus is the retreat of the abortion rights defender since both the evidence of life and the biological humanity of the unborn are uncontested facts. What else can they claim the unborn lacks if they wish to protect the “right” to abort them? They may be alive, they may be human, but they are not human persons.
Here is the oft-repeated tricky part for those who make this claim. What then constitutes the difference between a human being and a human person? The answers are wide and range from the arbitrarily absurd (breathing air) to the well articulated and clever (certain cerebral and cognitive developmental events). There is no clear answer to the question. But it is not acceptable for the defender of this position or any trained professional to then turn around and say, “Well, it sure is hard to determine personhood so the issue is irreconcilable.” In a different post, Dr. Stairs abdicates himself and all others from any responsibility to explain the determining point at all.
"It's hard to see why we'd have to have a sharp answer to the question of when something acquires rights or becomes a person, or becomes depressed or becomes fluent in a language or for that matter becomes a tree, or becomes bald... for it to be okay to say: "It's not there yet."
Personhood is their pet argument, not ours. They developed it to defend themselves against the growing evidence that other factors were settled. The unborn are unquestionably alive and biologically human. We argue that they are human beings by nature and deserve inclusion in the natural rights of the human family as articulated in the Declaration of Independence. That others arbitrarily decided that they are not persons without any ability to clearly explain what they mean by that does not make the identity of the unborn a question mark. It only calls into question the strength of this defense.
Notice that there are two built in back-up arguments as well. In stating that the issue is in part about the personhood of the unborn he leaves open the alternative of granting the personhood of the unborn but then arguing that the bodily autonomy of the woman weighs most heavily in the moral question. He dabbles in differentiating the difference between the two as relevant to the innocent present suffering of the person facing execution and the lack of suffering of the fetus:
"Abortion holds no such horror from the fetus's point of view, because the fetus doesn't have a point of view. It has no conception of its future, let alone of itself."
This is a complete whiff. The question is on the morality of what we are doing to (a) the person being executed and (b) the unborn life being aborted. I hope that Dr. Stairs is not suggesting that if we are capable of psychologically or medically creating a cognitive condition where by the innocent person facing execution did not suffer in any way that it would change the morality of unjustly killing them. If not, I am not certain how the presence of anguish and suffering weighs on the matter as to our treatment of the unborn.
The questioner might or might not have meant to use the term person in the question. The answer hinges on a trained professional philosopher not clarifying his terms. Those of us who argue in this area are keenly aware of the importance of word choice. It is our responsibility to clarify the different terms and the impact these terms have on the arguments to those asking direct questions. We must assume them to be less familiar with the nuances of language. If we do not, we are either being sloppy or intentionally vague.
His answer is a bit deceptive though. He frames the abortion issue as hinging on the identity of the fetus as a person and he develops a bit of straw man by behaving as if this was the claim of the pro-lifer in general.
"The question presumably isn't whether the fetus is biologically alive; it surely is. The question (or part of it anyway) is what this living being is. One common way of putting it is to ask whether the fetus is a person -- a being with the same moral standing as you or me."
He calls it the Ronald Reagan argument. My favorite line is where he states:
"Whether or not a fetus is a person seems to be what someone once called an essentially contested question: there may be no straightforward fact to be had."
This answer is misleading. Even if I am willing to stipulate the differentiation between the two objections; (1) Capital Punishment is morally wrong because we risk killing an innocent person. (2) Abortion is morally wrong because we risk killing an innocent person. The wrong of (1) is that we are certainly killing a person who may or may not have committed a capital offense. The wrong of (2) is that we are certainly killing an innocent life that may or may not be a person. Therefore the objections are of a different nature and do not demonstrate an inconsistency in the logic of the pro-choice capital punishment objector.
The problem in the answer is that he assumes too much. The question was framed using the word person and Dr. Stairs takes this allowance and runs with it without clarification. He is absolutely correct in stating that there may be no straightforward fact to be had on identifying a fetus as a person. That is not due to the nebulous nature of the fetus, though. It is because the term person and the qualities of personhood are themselves nebulous. The question of the humanity of the unborn is the central argument of the pro-life position. The personhood of the fetus is the retreat of the abortion rights defender since both the evidence of life and the biological humanity of the unborn are uncontested facts. What else can they claim the unborn lacks if they wish to protect the “right” to abort them? They may be alive, they may be human, but they are not human persons.
Here is the oft-repeated tricky part for those who make this claim. What then constitutes the difference between a human being and a human person? The answers are wide and range from the arbitrarily absurd (breathing air) to the well articulated and clever (certain cerebral and cognitive developmental events). There is no clear answer to the question. But it is not acceptable for the defender of this position or any trained professional to then turn around and say, “Well, it sure is hard to determine personhood so the issue is irreconcilable.” In a different post, Dr. Stairs abdicates himself and all others from any responsibility to explain the determining point at all.
"It's hard to see why we'd have to have a sharp answer to the question of when something acquires rights or becomes a person, or becomes depressed or becomes fluent in a language or for that matter becomes a tree, or becomes bald... for it to be okay to say: "It's not there yet."
Personhood is their pet argument, not ours. They developed it to defend themselves against the growing evidence that other factors were settled. The unborn are unquestionably alive and biologically human. We argue that they are human beings by nature and deserve inclusion in the natural rights of the human family as articulated in the Declaration of Independence. That others arbitrarily decided that they are not persons without any ability to clearly explain what they mean by that does not make the identity of the unborn a question mark. It only calls into question the strength of this defense.
Notice that there are two built in back-up arguments as well. In stating that the issue is in part about the personhood of the unborn he leaves open the alternative of granting the personhood of the unborn but then arguing that the bodily autonomy of the woman weighs most heavily in the moral question. He dabbles in differentiating the difference between the two as relevant to the innocent present suffering of the person facing execution and the lack of suffering of the fetus:
"Abortion holds no such horror from the fetus's point of view, because the fetus doesn't have a point of view. It has no conception of its future, let alone of itself."
This is a complete whiff. The question is on the morality of what we are doing to (a) the person being executed and (b) the unborn life being aborted. I hope that Dr. Stairs is not suggesting that if we are capable of psychologically or medically creating a cognitive condition where by the innocent person facing execution did not suffer in any way that it would change the morality of unjustly killing them. If not, I am not certain how the presence of anguish and suffering weighs on the matter as to our treatment of the unborn.
The questioner might or might not have meant to use the term person in the question. The answer hinges on a trained professional philosopher not clarifying his terms. Those of us who argue in this area are keenly aware of the importance of word choice. It is our responsibility to clarify the different terms and the impact these terms have on the arguments to those asking direct questions. We must assume them to be less familiar with the nuances of language. If we do not, we are either being sloppy or intentionally vague.
A few Links [SK]
1. Daniel Bonevac writes on divisive chruch-growth strategies, and how to detect them in your own church. Meanwhile, Breakpoint Blog has a discussion on why modern evangelicalism is viewed poorly. Though neither post is about pro-life issues per se, my own experience is that many churches who buy into seeker-friendly formats stop talking about abortion (and the gospel). That's not to say everything contemporary is bad, only that market-driven churches tend to preach, well, what the market wants to hear. And that market aint into abortion talks.
3. Serge, you don't need to fret: I'm not suicidal over the Dodger meltdown--I'm used to it. Shucks, it's been 19 years since the last meanningful Dodger moment.
Thursday, September 27, 2007
Faith, Science, and Stem Cells: What if There are a Bunch of Swamis? (Part 5) [Serge]
I'm certainly not one to visit a psychic, but imagine one day you drove past a building advertising a psychic with a crystal ball. A few blocks later, another psychic has a sign in the window that states "we have ten crystal balls!". The question is, who is better at predicting the truth?
Clearly, if a crystal ball is not an effective way of predicting the future, then ten crystal balls will be no better than one crystal ball in telling you next week lottery numbers. This also means that going to psychics and playing the lottery are unwise choices, but that must wait until another post.
Using this same logic, if one scientist makes a prediction that is not based on solid evidence, then having a large number of scientists agreeing with the prediction is no greater indicator that the prediction will come true. The important aspect about any prediction about the future is the available evidence that one is using for making such a claim, not the number of individuals that agree with you. Even if those individuals happen to wear white lab coats. It is important to remember that these scientists are not making scientific predictions - they are expressing their faith-based hopes. They are not looking into their microscopes for the data that supports these predictions, but instead are consulting their crystal balls.
For example, here is a letter given to Congress by the American Association for the Advancement of Science regarding the debate on embryonic stem cells:
Just like the crystal ball example, we should look at the history of such predictions especially in regards to the incredible cures that are promised "just around the corner" as long as we give them lots of money. The examples of predictions by scientists that have not panned out are numerous and easy to find. Every single time you read about a drug that needs to be recalled should remind us that there was a time in which the "consensus medical opinion" supported the use of the drug. Every so often we hear about a potential cure for cancer - yet even today our main strategy for treating cancer is basically unchanged for the past 40 years. We either cut it out or poison it.
This is not to say we should have a completely skeptical view - but we should pause and investigate when confronted with miraculous claims. We should look at the advantages and challenges of any form of medical research. We should not only examine the ethics of the practice itself but the future impact of that practice on humanity. The faith-based predictions of any number of scientists does not indicate science. Hope is good, but self-serving false hope is cruel, when it comes either from a crystal ball or the mouth of a "scientist".
Clearly, if a crystal ball is not an effective way of predicting the future, then ten crystal balls will be no better than one crystal ball in telling you next week lottery numbers. This also means that going to psychics and playing the lottery are unwise choices, but that must wait until another post.
Using this same logic, if one scientist makes a prediction that is not based on solid evidence, then having a large number of scientists agreeing with the prediction is no greater indicator that the prediction will come true. The important aspect about any prediction about the future is the available evidence that one is using for making such a claim, not the number of individuals that agree with you. Even if those individuals happen to wear white lab coats. It is important to remember that these scientists are not making scientific predictions - they are expressing their faith-based hopes. They are not looking into their microscopes for the data that supports these predictions, but instead are consulting their crystal balls.
For example, here is a letter given to Congress by the American Association for the Advancement of Science regarding the debate on embryonic stem cells:
The scientific consensus is that embryonic stem cell research is an extremely promising field of research that may lead to the development of more effective treatments for devastating conditions like diabetes, spinal cord injuries, and Parkinson’s disease.A mentor of mine likes to remind us that the absence of consensus does not mean the absence of truth. Likewise, simply because a certain group, with preconceived ideologies regarding science, agree on a faith-based idea, it does not indicate either a scientific truth or even a scientific theory.
Just like the crystal ball example, we should look at the history of such predictions especially in regards to the incredible cures that are promised "just around the corner" as long as we give them lots of money. The examples of predictions by scientists that have not panned out are numerous and easy to find. Every single time you read about a drug that needs to be recalled should remind us that there was a time in which the "consensus medical opinion" supported the use of the drug. Every so often we hear about a potential cure for cancer - yet even today our main strategy for treating cancer is basically unchanged for the past 40 years. We either cut it out or poison it.
This is not to say we should have a completely skeptical view - but we should pause and investigate when confronted with miraculous claims. We should look at the advantages and challenges of any form of medical research. We should not only examine the ethics of the practice itself but the future impact of that practice on humanity. The faith-based predictions of any number of scientists does not indicate science. Hope is good, but self-serving false hope is cruel, when it comes either from a crystal ball or the mouth of a "scientist".
Serge on Issues Etc. [Serge]
Todd Wilken of Issues etc interviewed me yesterday regarding my article on the bodily autonomy argument for abortion rights in the Christian Research Journal. It wasn't easy changing gears so quickly (the interview started about 5 minutes after I saw my last patient) but Todd is quite a gracious host. The program often focuses on apologetics and the list of those they have had on (including Scott a number of times) is very humbling. Anyone interested can listen to it here.
Wednesday, September 26, 2007
Beckwith #7: Problems with Thomson's 'Equal Reasonableness' [SK]
Previous Posts on Beckwith's Defending Life:
#1 Overview of major themes
#2 The nature of moral reasoning
#3 What Roe said and did, part 1
#4 Roe, part 2: Blackmun undercuts his own case
#5 Roe, part 3: Blackmun's viability errors
#6: Metaphysics and abortion debate
(Note: National Review has just published its own take on Defending Life.)
Frank concludes chapter 3 with a discussion of Judith Jarvis Thomson's equal reasonableness defense of abortion. Thomson, famous for conceding the humanity of the unborn in her 1971 "violinist" essay (which Frank deals with in chapter 7), concedes the reasonableness of the pro-life position. However, that does not mean she thinks abortion is wrong. To the contrary, she thinks those who favor abortion rights are equally reasonable. She writes, "while I know of no conclusive reason for denying that fertilized eggs have a right to life, I also know of no conclusive reason for asserting that they do have a right to life." In other words, those who reject a reasonable pro-life argument are not unreasonable for doing so. Thus, the issue of fetal personhood is up for grabs with no side clearly winning the day. Given this impasse, Thomson says the woman's liberty to abort must prevail. "Severe constraints on liberty may not be imposed in the name of considerations that the constrained are not unreasonable in rejecting."
Frank points out three problems with Thomson's argument. First, she does not adequately assess the strongest pro-life argument when she claims the abortion-choice one is equally reasonable. Her presentation of the pro-life view amounts to this: The fertilized egg contains a biological code that will govern its entire future development, therefore, it is already a human being with a right to life.
Though popular on the street, Thomson's summary of the pro-life argument ignores the sophisticated case some philosophers and apologists make for the full humanity of the unborn based on the substance view of human persons. That view states that a human being is intrinsically valuable in virtue of the kind of thing it is, a substance with a rational nature that maintains its identity through time and change. Put simply, the adult you are today is identical to the fetus you once were. Thus, if you are intrinsically valuable today, you were back then as well. (In short, you are valuable by nature not function.) Thomson makes no attempt to engage this metaphysically rich pro-life argument. (She's also wrong about the embryo being a "fertilized egg"--sperm and egg cease to exist at the completion of the conception process and give rise to a new human organism.)
Second, it is not unreasonable to reject Thomson's position. Consider Thomson's primary claim: "Severe constraints on liberty may not be imposed in the name of considerations that the constrained are not unreasonable in rejecting." Why should anyone believe that? She never tells us. She merely asserts it. Moreover, Thomson wants to use the law to constrain the liberty of pro-life lawmakers and activists who seek to legislate protection for the unborn--even though, as she concedes, it is not unreasonable for them to reject the abortion-choice view in favor of the pro-life one.
Third, Thomson never tells us why "liberty" is the highest good when all sides (we'll assume for the sake of discussion) have equally reasonable arguments. Indeed, if it's true that no one position--abortion-choice or pro-life--wins the day on the moral status of the unborn, this is an excellent reason not to permit abortion, because the odds are at least 50/50 that an abortion results in the death of a human entity with a full right to life. Given those odds, we should err on the side of life, not liberty. Frank provides the following example:
#1 Overview of major themes
#2 The nature of moral reasoning
#3 What Roe said and did, part 1
#4 Roe, part 2: Blackmun undercuts his own case
#5 Roe, part 3: Blackmun's viability errors
#6: Metaphysics and abortion debate
(Note: National Review has just published its own take on Defending Life.)
Frank concludes chapter 3 with a discussion of Judith Jarvis Thomson's equal reasonableness defense of abortion. Thomson, famous for conceding the humanity of the unborn in her 1971 "violinist" essay (which Frank deals with in chapter 7), concedes the reasonableness of the pro-life position. However, that does not mean she thinks abortion is wrong. To the contrary, she thinks those who favor abortion rights are equally reasonable. She writes, "while I know of no conclusive reason for denying that fertilized eggs have a right to life, I also know of no conclusive reason for asserting that they do have a right to life." In other words, those who reject a reasonable pro-life argument are not unreasonable for doing so. Thus, the issue of fetal personhood is up for grabs with no side clearly winning the day. Given this impasse, Thomson says the woman's liberty to abort must prevail. "Severe constraints on liberty may not be imposed in the name of considerations that the constrained are not unreasonable in rejecting."
Frank points out three problems with Thomson's argument. First, she does not adequately assess the strongest pro-life argument when she claims the abortion-choice one is equally reasonable. Her presentation of the pro-life view amounts to this: The fertilized egg contains a biological code that will govern its entire future development, therefore, it is already a human being with a right to life.
Though popular on the street, Thomson's summary of the pro-life argument ignores the sophisticated case some philosophers and apologists make for the full humanity of the unborn based on the substance view of human persons. That view states that a human being is intrinsically valuable in virtue of the kind of thing it is, a substance with a rational nature that maintains its identity through time and change. Put simply, the adult you are today is identical to the fetus you once were. Thus, if you are intrinsically valuable today, you were back then as well. (In short, you are valuable by nature not function.) Thomson makes no attempt to engage this metaphysically rich pro-life argument. (She's also wrong about the embryo being a "fertilized egg"--sperm and egg cease to exist at the completion of the conception process and give rise to a new human organism.)
Second, it is not unreasonable to reject Thomson's position. Consider Thomson's primary claim: "Severe constraints on liberty may not be imposed in the name of considerations that the constrained are not unreasonable in rejecting." Why should anyone believe that? She never tells us. She merely asserts it. Moreover, Thomson wants to use the law to constrain the liberty of pro-life lawmakers and activists who seek to legislate protection for the unborn--even though, as she concedes, it is not unreasonable for them to reject the abortion-choice view in favor of the pro-life one.
Third, Thomson never tells us why "liberty" is the highest good when all sides (we'll assume for the sake of discussion) have equally reasonable arguments. Indeed, if it's true that no one position--abortion-choice or pro-life--wins the day on the moral status of the unborn, this is an excellent reason not to permit abortion, because the odds are at least 50/50 that an abortion results in the death of a human entity with a full right to life. Given those odds, we should err on the side of life, not liberty. Frank provides the following example:
"Imagine the police are able to identify someone as a murderer with only one piece of evidence: his DNA matches the DNA of the genetic material found on the victim. The police subsequently arrest him, and he is convicted and sentenced to death. Suppose, however, that it is discovered several months later that the murderer has an identical twin brother who was also at the scene of the crime and obviously has the same DNA as his brother on death row. This means that there is a 50/50 chance that the man on death row is the murderer. Would the state be justified in executing this man? Surely not, for there is a 50/50 chance of executing an innocent person. Consequently, if it is wrong to kill the man on death row, it is then wrong to kill the unborn when the arguments for its full humanity are just as reasonable as the arguments against it."Finally, Thomson's own "liberty" principle--namely, "severe constraints on liberty may not be imposed in the name of considerations that the constrained are not unreasonable in rejecting--collapses into absurdity with Frank's shooting range illustration:
"Suppose that there is a shooting range in Central Texas, located only 1,000 feet from the playground of a local elementary school. The county commission, at the request of concerned parents and teachers, prohibits the shooting range to operate when the students at the school are on the playground, because there is a 1 in 100 chance a bullet will ricochet off one of the targets and hit a child. Imagine the marksmen who practice at the range, with the support of the range's ownership, employ Thomson's principle to rebut the commission's policy: "Severe constraints on liberty may not be imposed in the name of considerations that the constrained are not unreasonable in rejecting." The response on the part of the commission would likely be: "Yes, your principle may be correct, but you are in fact unreasonable in rejecting the policy's constraint on your liberty, for reason requires that you accept a public policy to protect the innocent from unjust harm even if there is only a 1 in 100 chance of it occurring."
Science, Faith, and Stem Cells: Science or Swami? (Part 4) [Serge]
Others in the Series
I've been busy for a bit, presently mourning the fact that my beloved Tigers (and Scott's Dodgers) will not be in the post season this year. Yet I was confident that there would be no shortage of examples of scientists making faith-based statements when I returned. Of course, I was not disappointed.
The latest scientist to get his faith-based views aired as "science" is veterinarian Dolly cloner Ian Wilmut. Ian tends to make a lot of claims, and I won't deny that his use of SCNT to clone a sheep was quite an accomplishment, but see if you can detect the science in this story:
Wilmut may be lacking ethical standards, but his faith is fully intact.
HT: Wesley Smith
I've been busy for a bit, presently mourning the fact that my beloved Tigers (and Scott's Dodgers) will not be in the post season this year. Yet I was confident that there would be no shortage of examples of scientists making faith-based statements when I returned. Of course, I was not disappointed.
The latest scientist to get his faith-based views aired as "science" is veterinarian Dolly cloner Ian Wilmut. Ian tends to make a lot of claims, and I won't deny that his use of SCNT to clone a sheep was quite an accomplishment, but see if you can detect the science in this story:
Wilmut is looking into his Crystal ball and making bold predictions. Predictions themselves are useless unless they have some evidence behind them. Does Wilmut offer any new research that would indicate that "revolutionary therapies" would be around in a decade? Is there any indication that the problems with ESCR and human cloning are in any danger of being overcome? Is there any accountability in the future regarding these predictions? There is not. The media simply reports the unchallenged words of a scientist and claims they are science. His predictions are mere faith-based assertions.THE CREATOR of Dolly the sheep has predicted that treatments using stem cells could become as common as antibiotics.
Professor Ian Wilmut, director of the Scottish Centre for Regenerative Medicine at Edinburgh University, said the first of these revolutionary therapies is expected to be available in around a decade and will develop rapidly over the coming years.
Lets do some math. The first mammal embryonic stem cell was isolated in 1981 from a mouse. The first human embryonic stem cell was isolated in 1998. That means we have worked with ESCs for 26 years with mammals and 9 years with humans. So far, we have had not one cure of a disease in animals (without significant complications) and not one attempted treatment in human beings. Yet Wilmut asserts that stem cell cures will be as readily available as antibiotics in a mere ten years. As if we can simply stroll down to a neighborhood pharmacy and pick out our newly cloned embryos that will make us a "repair kit" to use at our convenience.Wilmut pointed out that researchers around the world were already considering the use of stem cells to repair corneas, bones and specific cases of spinal cord injury.
"New therapies are just the same as medicines, they have to be tested and shown to be effective and safe," he said. "So it will be a small number of cases and a small number of treatments first, which will grow over the years and the decades.
Wilmut may be lacking ethical standards, but his faith is fully intact.
HT: Wesley Smith
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